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Abstract
WHEN AND WHY PHYSICIANS DECEIVE: INTERACTIONS WITH THIRD-PARTY PAYERS.
David E. Geist, Elizabeth H. Bradley, and Sidney T. Bogardus, Jr. Department of Medicine and
Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT.

Background and Aims: Physicians may sometimes manipulate reimbursement rules, game the system and
deceive third-party payers (TPPs). Our aims were to characterize the diversity of deceptive tactics
physicians use, identify the goals that physicians seek to achieve through these actions, and to analyze the
language and justifications that physicians employ when describing such deceptions.
Methods: This was a qualitative study based on purposeful sampling using open-ended interviews and the
constant comparative method of qualitative data analysis. Interviews were conducted until the point of
theoretical saturation with 24 physicians in greater New Haven, Connecticut who were selected to reflect
breadth of specialty, professional setting, gender and years in practice.
Results: Deception of third-party payers was self-reported by almost all physicians interviewed, with a
frequency of deceptions ranging from zero to 275 times over the past year. Physician reported deceptions
were diverse and involved all aspects of the physician-patient encounter. Physicians employed deceptive
tactics to achieve four primary goals: 1) relieve patient financial burden, 2) relieve other burdens of care, 3)
protect patient privacy, and 4) increase physician reimbursement. Justifications for deceptive actions
included 1) for patient benefit, 2) to preserve physician autonomy and 3) because the system was broken.
Physicians often used euphemisms to describe their deceptive actions.
Conclusions: These findings are concerning for patient-physician trust and raise challenges to physician
professionalism. Physician deceptions of third-party payers have implications for health care policy and
medical research. The use of deception may be a barometer of those areas where the dissonance between
care and rules have become so severe that physicians see violating their professional codes as the only way
to do their jobs.
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Introduction and Statement of Purpose
Physicians who "manipulate"(l) reimbursement rules, "game the system"(2) or
"deceive"(3) third-party payers (TPPs) have garnered much attention lately.(4-11) Such
physicians are depicted both as noble advocates seeking to secure care for patients within
an incomprehensible health care system(5) and as greedy professionals manipulating that
system for their own gain(4, 6). Some argue that these behaviors can be justified by
unfair or illegal rules and burdensome paperwork(7). Others insist that manipulative or
deceptive tactics violate ethical physician conduct( 12) potentially undermine the
physician-patient relationship, and place the medical profession at risk(2).
Although this type of behavior goes by many names, each implying varying
degrees of ethical misconduct and illegality, gaming, manipulation and deception of TPPs
clearly happens(l, 3, 13, 14). In a random national sample of 720 practicing physicians,
39% reported that they had manipulated reimbursement rules to help patients secure
coverage for needed treatments or services in the last year( 1). Manipulations included
exaggerating the severity of the patient’s condition, reporting unfounded signs or
symptoms, or changing the patient’s diagnosis for billing purposes(l). In another study,
50% of primary care physicians reported that they had substituted another diagnostic
code for major depression in the billing of services for at least one patient within the
previous two weeks(14). Studies based on hypothetical vignettes(3, 13) also suggest high
rates of TPP "deception" to obtain coverage for procedures such as coronary artery
bypass graft surgery and arterial revascularization(3).
Relatively little is known about the goals of such physician actions. It has been
reported that physicians deceive because of uncertainty about diagnoses, problems with
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reimbursement when certain diagnoses are used,(14) and a desire to obtain additional
coverage for patients.(3) It has also been hypothesized that physicians "game the system"
when resource rules do not serve patient needs or when they perceive needless obstacles
to care(2). How physicians justify their deceptive actions and the specific language they
employ when talking about deceptions has also not been reported.
We undertook a qualitative study with the aims of 1) characterizing the range of
deceptive tactics physicians use in their interaction with TPPs, 2) identifying the goals
that physicians seek to achieve through the use of such tactics, and 3) understanding the
justifications physicians give for deceiving the language they employing when discussing
the topic of deception. In this study we asked physicians to describe instances when they
believed themselves or others in their profession to have been "deceptive" with TPPs.
We allowed physicians characterize the meaning of deception with their stories. How
and why physicians deceive third-party payers are important questions relevant to the
physician-patient relationship, physician professionalism, health care policy, patient
rights, and medical research. A fuller understanding of deceptive behavior might enable
policy makers and individual physicians to modify their positions and practices to better
serve the needs of their patients and the profession.
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Methods
Study Design and Sample
This was a qualitative study based on open-ended interviews that I conducted with
physicians in greater New Haven, Connecticut during July and August of 2000. The
qualitative approach was chosen to enable the comprehensive description of the range of
tactics used to deceive third-party payers, as is not available in the existing literature.
Qualitative methods are well suited for exploratory, descriptive studies for which
previous literature is limited! 15). In addition, we anticipated that such deceptive tactics
would be multifarious and difficult to measure; qualitative research can useful for
describing diverse facets and dimensions of such behaviors! 15, 16). Such studies are also
useful for generating hypotheses that can later be tested with quantitative data(15, 17).
The study employed purposeful sampling as is standard in qualitative research! 15,
17). Physicians were selected to reflect breadth of specialty (primary care physicians,
specialists), professional setting (academic, private, solo practice, group practice) gender,
and years in practice. Additional physicians were interviewed until no new concepts were
identified, i.e., until the point of theoretical saturation(17). This occurred after 24
interviews.

Data Collection
In-depth, open-ended interviews were conducted in person with physicians,
typically at their offices. I conducted the interviews after having been trained in
qualitative interviewing skills using a standard interview guide with probes for
clarification and additional detail. Interviews were audiotaped and professionally
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transcribed. The interview guide (Appendix 1) began with the broad question, "In your
field, what practices are you aware of that could be perceived as being deceptive of thirdparty payers?" If physicians did not describe personal examples they were then asked if
"anything you have done could be perceived as being deceptive." TPPs were defined as
governmental insurers (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid), managed care organizations, and
indemnity insurers, i.e., any organization that pays health care costs that would otherwise
fall to the individual patient. For each deceptive tactic described, physicians were asked
to illustrate their experiences with specific stories or vignettes and were asked to describe
their reason for using the tactic.

Data Analysis
The interview audiotapes were professionally transcribed. These transcribed data
were analyzed using common coding techniques for qualitative data and the constant
comparative method of data analysis! 17). Dr. Bogardus and I independently coded each
transcript and then met to review transcripts in joint sessions. Each successive interview
was analyzed shortly after completion to refine coding categories and modify the
interview guide for succeeding interviews. When coding of transcripts differed,
consensus was achieved through discussion. New codes were added when new concepts
were identified. Old codes were sometimes modified to accommodate new data. An
initial code list was empirically derived from the first three interviews. This code list was
reviewed by the full research team (myself, Dr. Bogardus and Prof. Bradley) and then
updated and refined by Dr. Bogardus and myself as each additional interview was
analyzed. I then entered coded data were in NUD-IST 4 (Sage Publications Software,
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Thousand Oaks, California) to assist in reporting recurrent themes, links among themes,
and supporting quotations. During its development, the code list was reviewed two more
times by the full research team for logic and breadth. A total of 506 specific codes
organized within 34 themes were developed and served as the basis for the final text
review and organization of the transcript data.
Several techniques were used to ensure that data collection and analysis was
systematic, as commonly recommended by experts in qualitative research(16). These
included use of a consistent interview guide, audiotaping interviews, independent
transcription of the audiotapes, and standardized coding and analysis of data. In order to
document analytic decisions, hand-written notes on printed transcripts showing each
researcher's coding, as well as changes to reach consensus, and records of each version of
the coding scheme were maintained. Some quotations reported here have been edited for
clarity and readability.

Results
Participant Characteristics
Participants were 24 physicians from the New Haven area (Table 1). Nine were
women, and seven were academic physicians. Participants practiced in primary care
fields (internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology) and specialty fields
(general surgery, psychiatry, medical oncology, dermatology, cardiology,
gastroenterology, geriatrics and otolaryngology). Participants had been in practice for
between two to 25 years and saw between three to 160 patients per week. The size of the

6
practices in which participant physicians were employed ranged from solo practices to
those as large as 16 physicians.

Existence of Deception
Deception of third-party payers was self-reported by almost all physicians
interviewed. Physicians of both genders, across all specialties, both in academia and
private practice, and of a varying lengths of practice reported using deceptive tactics
some of the time. Frequency of deceptive tactics varied widely; when asked to estimate
the number of times they had deceived third-party payers in the past year, physicians
reported a range from zero to 300 times. One gastroenterologist who reported using no
deceptive tactics explained himself as follows:
1 think it is a slippery slope, and although unethical means may justify ethical
ends, it can become increasingly a challenge to make those distinctions. It's much
cleaner, more comfortable and more professional to get what you want truthfully.
Although a few physicians reported using deceptive tactics with third-party payers
at least once per week, most reported their use as a relatively infrequent event.

Diversity of Deceptive Tactics
The diverse array of deceptive tactics reported by physicians can be described by
three fundamental characteristics (Table 2). The first pertains to the location within the
patient assessment where the tactic was used. The second pertains to the type of service
that physicians were attempting to augment. The third characteristic pertains to the
method of documentation used to enact the tactic. These characteristics can be used in
concert to describe each deceptive tactic.

7

Patient Assessment
Each step in patient assessment — history, symptoms and diagnosis — was subject
to use in a deceptive tactic. For instance, an internist describes misrepresenting a date in a
patient's history:
He came to see me because he had tested HIV positive a month ago. I wrote that
down, and then he said, " to be honest, I really found out last summer, but I don't
want you to put that down, because I applied for insurance in September"... In
that situation I did not document the earlier test.
In another example, a psychiatrist indicates that he would describe non-existent
symptoms to prolong treatment:
I'm thinking of one lady where her being better is a function of continuing
treatment. If she didn't have treatment, all of her symptoms would come back. So
I describe the symptoms that I think would come back. But they're not asking,
"What do you think would come back if treatment stopped?" They're saying,
"What are you treating?" So I answer it differently.

Type of Service
Physicians used deceptive tactics primarily around three types service: health
maintenance visits, screening tests and treatments. In this example an internist describes
obtaining coverage for a health maintenance visit by using a different diagnosis:
I've probably seen a patient in follow-up for depression and marked down a more
extensive exam, say for health maintenance and billed for depression. And I'll say
to the patient, "You're going to see on your bill today, 'depression.' Even though
that's not the focus of the visit, that's what I'm billing for. "
In another example, a gynecologist describes misrepresenting a patient's sexual
history to obtain coverage for a screening test:
There are places where you can check off that someone is at high risk for cervical
cancer because they have had multiple sexual partners. And that's an easy one to
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do because they are never going check and ask the woman, "how many sexual
partners?" They will assume that that's between me and the patient. And, of
course, I ask the women, "whether or not this is true, we're not going to pry into
your personal life, but this will get you coverage. Is that all right?"

Mode of Documentation
Physicians reported deceptive tactics involving misdocumentation of forms and
misdocumentation of the medical record. This oncologist describes misdocumenting a
form to obtain a necessary treatment:
I give chemotherapy to a patient with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and I know 10
days later their white blood cell count is going to get low And, I know’ that they
need to be treated on GCSF to stop that from happening. Medicare won't let me
do that until the second time I treat them, but I know it's going to happen the first
time. So, you have to say they are neutropenic so that you can treat them even if
they are not.
In another example of form misdocumentation, an internist describes securing
coverage for a particular medication:
It may be that (the medication) is only indicated for peptic ulcer disease and if I'm
giving it to somebody for GERD I'll write on the script "for peptic ulcer disease"
instead of GERD because I feel that this medication is indicated in their situation.

Goals of Deception
Analysis of interviews suggested that physicians employ deceptive tactics with
third-party payers to achieve at least one of four primary goals: relieving patient financial
burden (including expanding patient coverage), decreasing other burdens of care,
protecting patient privacy, and increasing physician reimbursement (Table 3). For a
given deceptive tactic, physicians may have multiple goals.
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Reduction of Patient Financial Burden
Reducing patient financial burden related to well-visits, diagnostic screening tests,
treatment of chronic conditions, and medications appeared to be a common goal of
physicians' deceptive tactics.
Often, patients must pay out of pocket for well-visits. A physician describes his
own experience as a patient in this situation:
I went to see my physician for a routine physical. At the end the bill said,
"diagnosis of chest pain " and so I said "I didn't come for chest pain. " They said,
well that is the only way we can get the EKG and all the other things paid for. So
I think (this kind of thing) is rapid and routine... but I was aware even as a
patient that this made me uncomfortable.
Physicians also frequently employed deceptive tactics in order to get diagnostic
screening tests covered by TPPs. Screening tests mentioned included PSA antigen test,
thyroid stimulating hormone, colonoscopy, bone density scan. Pap smear and
electrocardiogram. Physicians deceived when patients did not meet third-party payer
criteria for coverage of the desired diagnostic test, but the physician felt the test was
necessary. A gastroenterologist describes the commonly reported strategy of making up
a symptom that the physician knows will trigger coverage, in this case for a colonoscopy:
There are patients w>ho don't meet those strict criteria by the letter of the policy,
but come awfully close, in whom you really want to perform a screening
colonoscopy as opposed to a flexible sigmoidoscopy or barium enema, both of
which are inferior. As a result, you often want to do this procedure, but are
aware that there is great risk the insurer will not cover it. Rectal bleeding is an
indication for a colonoscopy. It would not be a "screening colonoscopy in an
asymptomatic individual, " it would be to "evaluate rectal bleeding. "
A third way that physicians reported reducing patient financial burden was by
expanding coverage of chronic conditions (e.g., obtaining additional hospital days, access
to restricted medications, additional physician visits). Physicians described choosing the
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diagnosis associated with the most coverage from among those diagnoses, which
conceivably fit the patient's condition. A medical oncologist describes how he will
sometimes contravene his best guess, and instead report the diagnosis that provides the
broadest coverage for the patient:
They will not pay unless there are clear indications that this medicine works. If it
is not on the FDA list, they will not pay for it. And, you sort of can't get around
that short of giving them the wrong diagnosis, which I have done sometimes when
it is not clear what the diagnosis is. Such as someone who has a carcinoma of
unknown primary—it could be coming from their lungs because they are a smoker
and I want to use a medicine that I know they will pay for so I'll call it a lung
cancer. It might be, but it might not be.
Another area where physicians reported reducing patient financial burden by
employing deceptive tactics with TPPs was medication prescriptions. Physicians
sometimes try to obtain coverage for medications that may be more effective, but more
expensive. They also may try to avoid burdensome medication changes or may try to
satisfy patient preference for a brand-name medication. An internist is describes one
such situation:
A patient called and said I want my inhalers renewed, but I don't like this one, I
like another one, and they only will pay for this one, so would you please write
and say that I didn't do well with other ones. I didn't know which other ones she
has tried, I've never met this patient, so I just said you have to tell me. Now that's
sort of a little bit gray, because I haven't tried her on those myself 1 didn't have
office visit notes that documented that.

Relief of Non-Financial Burdens of Care
A second, less frequently reported goal of physicians' deceptive tactics is relief of
non-financial burdens of care for patients. In serving this goal, there may not be a direct
financial benefit to either the physician or the patient, but TPPs are deceived in order to
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ease travel or time burdens that patients endure as part of care. A medical oncologist
describes one example of increasing the convenience of care:
So on a weekend we will sometimes give people these drugs to give
themselves ...which is technically illegal. We don't bill for giving them the drug,
but we will bill for the drug itself And then I just write an ambiguous note—
patient received 480 meg ofNeupogen. Supposedly you cannot bill for it unless
you are there in the office getting it and we have done that because it is a real
pain in the ass for a patient if they live 30 miles from here, to drive in here on a
weekend to get a shot that they can certainly do themselves, like giving themselves
insulin.
An internist provides another example, also meant to save the patient a trip to the
office:
But, sometimes people will call for referrals, and I think if you're really
upstanding you would say come on in, let me see you, I'll see if you need the
referral. Sometimes I just make the referral, and just based upon what the patient
tells me over the phone, so I suppose that's a little deceptive.

Protection of Patient Privacy
A third common goal was to protect patient privacy from third-party payers.
Deceptive tactics with this goal typically took the form of withholding information from
a patient chart to keep embarrassing or personal information strictly between the
physician and the patient or to avoid denial of access to unrelated opportunities
(employment, life insurance, etc.). In this first general example, a psychiatrist explains
the rationale for understating a diagnosis:
I think a physician might choose the lesser, I mean if there were some gray area, I
might choose the less severe diagnosis in order to protect patient confidentiality
and not have something potentially stigmatizing on their record.
A more specific example was given by this pediatrician:
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There is another issue around asthma which again involves a ton of cheating.
What is asthma? You do not know and I do not know’ because there are not any
clear boundaries to it, but there are tremendously powerful issues that are
associated with the naming, the naming of things. If I say that you are an eightyear-old kid and I say that you have asthma, you may never get into the Armed
Forces. You may have terrible trouble 30 years from now getting a life insurance
policy and so in a way, I cheat because I never put down asthma as a diagnosis
until the kid has been to the Intensive Care Unit.

Increasing Physician Reimbursement
A fourth goal of deceptive tactics was to increase physician reimbursement for
services provided. These practices include submitting a code for a more remunerative
service than the one actually provided ("upcoding"), performing unnecessary services so
that more remunerative codes can be accurately submitted, editing past documentation so
that audit penalties will be avoided, and failing to correct past reporting errors in the
physician's favor. Physicians interviewed for this study spoke less frequently about this
specific goal of deception than they did about expanding patient coverage. An
otolaryngologist reported the following:
One possibility would be doing more than you need to do. For example, there are
two types of ethmoidectomies that you can do—an anterior ethmoidectomy or a
total ethmoidectomy. And you can often tell by the scan—the pre-operative CT
scan—which are involved—just the anteriors or is it all of the ethnoids? If just the
anteriors are involved, do you just do an anterior ethmoidectomy or do you go
ahead and do a posterior ethmoidectomy because you get paid more for that ?
And I'm sure that goes on.
Here a physician described replying to a medical record audit of breast cancer
cases and providing missing information about location of the primary tumor so that his
practice would not be fined:
So a lot of them we found. And if I didn't find it, I figured, statistically, upper
outer (quadrant) is most common. Did I lie? I guess 1 might have. I don't know.
They did the same thing with lung cancer and colon cancer. And I'm convinced
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that all they're trying to do is avoid paying. It has nothing to do with the care of
the patient.
In the following instance, a physician describes an historical reporting mistake
that benefited his office financially. Even after it was discovered, it was not corrected:
I realized at one point my staff were not correctly coding and were not correctly
billing some things and that effect m>as that probably in some instances things
were billed out at a higher code than they probably should have been billed out.
Once I discovered that, and we talked it over in the office, and we set clear
guidelines, we certainly didn't go back and correct it.

Justifications for Deception
Physicians explained the actions they undertook in pursuit of these goals with
three common justifications. First, many physicians justified their deceptions based on
the perceived medical, social or financial benefits to patients. Second, physicians
justified deception as the only way to maintain their autonomy to make medical
decisions. These two themes often overlapped and many physicians reported that they
deceived because they felt they needed to freely exercise their medical judgment in order
to assure high quality patient care. And third, physicians stated that deceptions could be
justified when the health care system was perceived as broken or irrational.

Benefits the Patient
Many physicians attempted to morally ground their deceptions based upon the
argument that anything that benefits that patient is acceptable. A representative example
of this general theme was given by a pediatrician:
I think it's because they actually think that the patient needs care and that the
insurance company or Medicare is not going to give it to them. And I think that's
the managed care, again, tying our hands behind our backs and not letting us be
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doctors, not letting us do what we're trained to do and do what's best for the
patient.
An obstetrician justifies deception in this example by explaining how it socially
benefits the patient:
Yes, either I think the patient is unstable to go home or because of illness in her
child and because of post-partum patient, we try to justify an extra day in hospital
so that somebody that lives far away can easily be right here with a critically ill
newborn.
Physicians also justify their deceptions by arguing that patients benefit medically.
In this representative example a surgeon feels he can only provide appropriate medical
care by misrepresenting the size of a tumor:
There are certain health care plans that will not allow you to take it out in the
operating room unless it is over 3 cm. And so if it is 2.5 cm, I feel it is too big for
the office, so there I may say it is 3 cm, when in my mind, it is probably 2.5 cm.
Because otherwise then I have to take care of it in the office and I think it is too
much for the office and I think it is unsafe in the office.
Sometimes physicians justified their actions by citing their role as patient
advocates. An obstetrician/gynecologist describes why she deceives to gain coverage of
routine visits for a subgroup of her patients:
I kind of feel like I am the elderly advocate. Because they are the ones with the
most problems, and often times... they can't read their policy, their hearing is
impaired, they don't have the energy to fight Medicare... They need the most
help.
An internist describes her commitment to patient advocacy:
I think that doctors feel rightly or wrongly that by doing the deception, they're
really advocating for their patients. I don't think I would stick my neck out to the
tune of a potential audit and the money that I may end up losing ... and even go to
jail if in my heart, I didn't think my patients were the ultimate benefactors of that.
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Preserves Physician Autonomy
Physicians frequently justified their deceptive actions by stating that their
autonomy is threatened by restrictive third-party payer rules. Here a surgeon justifies
deceiving to obviate a prescribed length of stay:
If I am uncomfortable, if I am not ready to discharge a patient, I don't like being
told by a third-party payer that that its time for him to go, because they don't
know the situation well enough.
An internist justified getting around a restriction on medication prescription by
asserting her right to prescribe the right medication for the right situation:
It is the exact same medication, but for a different indication and I just don't think
that the third party payer has a right to tell me for what reason 1 can prescribe a
medication; it drives me crazy, it makes me really mad, so I just order it.
This internist justified her deception by asserting her right to make her own value
judgment in a complex situation:
There were competing values; the competing value of honesty, the competing
value of serving this person, who had complexity in his life. There was a need to
override the cost consideration with the ease consideration and what was I
dealing with here.

Broken System
Similarly, physicians cited a faulty system and irrational rules as a third
justification for their deceptions of third-party payers. A medical oncologist described
this situation as follows:
There are these arbitrary categories of things that they will and will not pay for
and decisions are made on payments, not on any kind of real medical basis that 1
can figure out. Again, so I don't feel that bad if I do something like that because I
don't think I am defrauding the government because I'm giving people treatment
that they need with drugs that are indicated for that problem.
An internist also explained such a justification quite bluntly:
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I thought that the rule was stupid, because why should he not get insurance, I will
be damned if I was going to take part in that. To what end? So that he wouldn't
get insurance to pay for his HIV care, so that I could follow’ a rule. The values
were way off here.

Euphemisms: the language of deception
Physicians often described actions that they perceive to be deceptive of thirdparty payers using euphemisms. One physician described his deceptive action this way:
Yes, I have written notes in the charts that have been, I guess in politics they call
it "spinning the patient's condition" to justify her spending more time than I
thought she needed in the hospital. There is no personal gain for me. It is the way
I think is in the patient's interest.
Other examples of euphemisms used to describe deceptive tactics include
"inflating up the truth," "sort of how you spin it," "go the extra mile and stretch the truth a
bit to get that done," "if I think I can stretch it a bit I will," "I am sure I have
embellished," "stressing more whatever the side of it that really needed to be stressed,"
"there is another way of sort of finessing things that hovers on the edge of troublesome,"
and "create more of a diagnosis than there was."

Discussion
Overview
The results of this study are consistent with previous work demonstrating that
physicians use deceptive tactics with TPPs and expand on that work to elucidate the
goals, justifications and language of deception. Physicians of diverse background,
specialty and practice setting reported the use a wide range of deceptive tactics in their
dealings with TPPs. These tactics can be located in three separate aspects of the
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physician-patient encounter (Table 2): patient assessment, type of service, and mode of
documentation. Additionally, this study finds that deceptive tactics are not limited to a
few select scenarios but are employed to gain coverage for services, particularly wellvisits, screening tests and access to medications. Although the variety of deceptive tactics
varied widely, four goals (Table 3) emerged as the fundamental reasons that physicians
use such tactics with TPPs: expanding coverage and/or decreasing patient financial
burden, decreasing other burdens of care, protecting patient privacy, and increasing
physician reimbursement. Though the majority of deceptions were undertaken for the
betterment of patient care, some were purely for financial gain.
When explaining the need to use deceptive tactics, physicians gave three common
justifications: doing what is best for the patient, maintaining their autonomy, and working
within a broken system. Analysis of the language used by physicians to describe their
own deceptions revealed frequent use of euphemisms. Overall, physician self-reporting of
deception of third-party payers raises concerns about the physician-patient relationship
and physician professionalism and has important implications for health care policy and
medical research.

Potential Response to Deception
One response to these deceptive tactics might be increased oversight of physician
behavior. Current anti-fraud initiatives have been successful at reducing the Medicare
error rate( 18 ) through both fear of penalty and through the sentinel effect( 19). However,
the current focus of prosecution is on providers who systematically commit fraud(20).
Oversight sufficient to detect the subtle deceptions described in this study may be so
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financially costly and so burdensome to the profession (e.g., further loss of physician
autonomy, decreased physician satisfaction due to increased scrutiny(20)) as to be
unworkable. It may be more fruitful to consider the impact and root causes of physician
deceptions in order to arrive at a more trenchant proposal for reform.

Physician-Patient Relationship
These findings are concerning for the patient-physician relationship. Although
some patients may receive additional, necessary care as a result of deceiving physicians,
the distribution of this care is necessarily haphazard. Patients without deceptive
physicians may suffer as deficient areas of care are managed subversively on a case-by¬
case basis rather than challenged openly in hopes of changing the system for all. For this
reason, some patients may find themselves drawn to physicians who will use deceptive
tactics for patient benefit.
The impact of deceptive tactics with TPPs on patient trust needs to be determined.
Patients may find comfort in joining with their physician against an unsatisfactory TPP.
Or, patient trust in their physician may suffer when the patient is aware of physician
deception. Patients who do not trust their physicians may withhold information crucial to
their own care and take costly steps to guard against poor care, such as obtaining multiple
opinions(21) and pursuing complaints against physicians. Along with the risk to
individual relationships between physicians and patients, we must also be concerned for
the general perception by the public of deceiving physicians, even in those cases where
the motivation is clearly to improve patient care.
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Physician Professionalism
These results also reflect severe challenges to the medical profession under the
current health care environment. The notion of professionalism can be defined as 1) a
specialized body of knowledge, 2) control over training and labor markets and 3)
devotion to a public good or "higher calling."(22) Added to that, Freidson describes the
"soul of professionalism" as the "freedom to judge and choose the ends of work.."(22)
For many physicians, the demands of the managed care combined with the emergence of
consumerism as a driving force in health care has weakened their role as professionals.
In justifying their deceptions, these physicians direct us to two specific challenges. In
citing a desire to do what is best for the patient, physicians justified their actions by
claiming they were otherwise unable to maintain their devotion to a higher calling or
patient advocacy. In citing their need to maintain autonomy regarding medical decision
making, physicians exhibit frustration with a loss of control over the ends of their work.
But physicians who deceive TPPs, while struggling nobly to maintain their
professionalism, are sacrificing other values central to the profession: truth and
integrity.(23) Stephen Carter defines integrity as (1) discerning right from wrong, (2)
acting on the right (even at a personal cost) and (3) stating openly that you are acting on
your understanding of the right.(24) While the physicians in this study may succeed at
discerning right from wrong and acting on their decision, they fail to be open about their
actions. Whether this is for fear of prosecution or for fear of being judged by those inside
or outside the profession, we do not know. They deceive quietly and their integrity
suffers.
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Deception as Euphemism
Not only are these deceptions reflective of challenges to the profession as a
whole, but they also reflect an internal struggle within each individual professional. By
examining the language that physicians use to talk about deception, we gain some insight
on this struggle. We found that physicians frequently used euphemisms when discussing
deception. Euphemisms substitute "an agreeable or inoffensive word or expression for
one that is harsh, indelicate or otherwise unpleasant or taboo."(25) "Stretching the truth"
sounds much more palatable than "lying," especially to a professional whose core value is
truthfulness. As Allan and Burridge explain, speakers often use euphemisms as a
protective shield against the anger or disapproval of others.(26) These physicians feel
under siege and the euphemism is a defense. The euphemism mitigates the internal
struggle and protects the physician from external judgment — but at what cost?
Stein comments further on the use of euphemism as a defense in a health care
setting in Euphemism, Spin cmd the Crisis of Organizational Life, writing that
euphemisms are "slippery language that humans devise to justify themselves to
others."(27) Stein goes onto argue that the cost-control and efficiency championed by
managed care are really an grand euphemism — that is a sociologic structure created to
obscure true purpose — for our willingness as a society to leave the needy and sick
outside the bounds of quality health care while keeping the rich and wealthy alive.(27)
Thus, in his view "caring" and "managed care" are effectively incompatible. While this
may be an extreme position, it is a useful framework to consider. One could argue that
some physicians bridge this incompatibility (between their perception of appropriate
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health care and the confines of TPP rules) with deceptions and then employ their own
personal euphemisms to protect themselves from criticism.
Many physicians in this study sense that something is grossly amiss with the
health care system, but their deceptions are themselves a euphemism — a poorer, selfprotective stand-in — for battling the system openly. Thus, by committing secretive
deceptions and compromising their integrity, they protect not only themselves from
criticism, but the system as well. The result is not just unhappy professionals. Patient
care may suffer from disgruntled physicians, the profession may lose current physicians
to more satisfying careers, and future physicians may be dissuaded from entering the
medical field altogether (or particular segments of the field such as the primary care
specialties) when they learn of the loss of professional satisfaction.

Other Concerns
These physicians were well-intentioned and genuinely concerned with the care of
their patients. Nonetheless, it is important to understand potentially indirect motivations
to deceive. Patients are less satisfied and more likely to leave managed care plans, for
example, when denied access to specialists(28). This reaction may extend to physicians
generally, so that, as mentioned previously, those unwilling to manipulate the system lose
patients to those who will. Deception may result in an indirect financial benefit to the
physician, both from increased services and from increased practice size through
returning patients and referrals. We studied both academic and community physicians,
and both groups admitted to deceptions. Because this is a qualitative study, we could not
distinguish tendencies between the two groups. However, it would be interesting to
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investigate whether community physicians, whose salaries are tied to patient volume, are
more likely to deceive than academic physicians, whose salaries are typically fixed by
their institution.
These results should raise concerns about medical research as well. Much
powerful epidemiologic research has resulted from analysis of large scale retrospective
chart and document reviews. It is clear that these deceptions, which permeate all aspects
of health care delivery, could affect such results in unpredictable ways. Based on our
study, it is unlikely that these deceptions are pervasive enough to undermine results at
this time, but we were not able to assess the frequency of deceptive actions in this
qualitative study. The results of previous quantitative studies of deception, however, are
concerning for research outcomes.(3, 13, 14)

Strengths and Limitations
By allowing physicians to define for themselves those practices they felt were
deceptive, and thus recording actual experiences, it was possible to capture the full range
of deceptive tactics and the goals and justifications underlying them. Because the study
was qualitative with a nonrandom sample, the prevalence of deception could not be
measured. Participants were physicians in one geographic area and may not be
representative of the experiences of physicians around the country given the variety of
TPPs in different regions. Physicians may not have revealed their worst deceptions
(especially those that involved personal financial gain or embarrassment) and may have
selectively reported certain types of deceptions.

23

Conclusion
The extent of deception reported in this study highlights serious challenges to the
medical profession and probably reflects serious problems with health care delivery and
financing in the United States. These physicians themselves were well-intentioned, often
placing themselves at some risk for a perceived benefit to their patients. They made
judgments that distinguished right from wrong and acted on them, though fell short in
acting covertly against a system many feel is irrational and unjust. Their discomfort with
their deceptive actions is clear and undermines their professional satisfaction.
While deception of third-party payers violates core physician values (and laws) it
may be more fruitful to view these actions as a symptom rather than the disease. Under
this model, deception may be a barometer of those areas where the dissonance between
care and rules has become so severe that physicians see violating their professional codes
as the only way to do their jobs. Both physicians and TPPs may benefit from addressing
areas such as health-maintenance visits, screening tests and access to medication directly
and openly. Physicians may benefit by improved patient relationships and professional
satisfaction. TPPs may benefit through improved reputations and patient satisfaction.
The cost of acknowledging this dissonance is unknown. TPPs may pay an economic
cost. Physicians may find themselves beholden to additional rules.
Though individual physicians can certainly make a difference, physician
professional organizations must play a central role. Recent activism directed at
controlling malpractice insurance costs is promising.(29, 30) But the root causes of
physician deception of third-party payers are more complicated and entrenched. A
solution may not be reached until the health care system is rationalized and brought up to
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date with both the needs of the uninsured and the consumer desires of middle class and
wealthy Americans.
Physician organizations might consider backing an initiative to eliminate the
employer-as-middle-man in the delivery of health care options and costs. Currently,
third-party payers and employers negotiate rates and policies with their own bottom lines
a top priority and with little input from end consumers. Allowing consumers a varied
menu of health care plans to chose from should help rationalize rules and costs. It will
also give physicians and society a fresh perspective on the choices Americans make
regarding health care. Part of the problem that the physicins in this study face is that
neither they nor their patients really know what a health care plan really buys, or often
does not buy. Again, deceptions provide unintentional cover for both parties' ignorance.
Hopefully the profession of medicine has not yet reached a point of no return
where gaming the system and using deceptive tactics are viewed as a permanent and
necessary evil. Unlike in law, where the adversarial system serves to preserve rights and
freedoms, in medicine adversarial behavior and deceptive tactics are at best an inefficient
way to control costs and at worst a true detriment to patient care.
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Table 1. Participant Characteristics

Characteristic
Specialty
Cardiology, n (%)
Dermatology, n (%)

1 (4)

Gastroenterology, n (%)

2(8)

General Surgery, n (%)

1(4)

Geriatrics, n (%)

2(8)

Internal Medicine, n (%)

1 (4)

Medical Oncology, n (%)

7(29)

Obstetrics and Gynecology, n (%)

2(8)

Otolaryngology, n (%)

2 (8)

Pediatrics, n (%)

1(4)

Psychiatry, n (%)

2(8)
3(13)

Female Gender, n (%)

9(38)

Academic, n (%)

7(29)

Years in practice, median (range)

14(2-25)

Patients seen per week, median (range)

70(4- 150)

Number of deceptions per year, median (range)

6 (0 - 275)
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Table 2. Characteristics of Deceptive Tactics

Characteristic

Examples

Patient Assessment

History
Symptoms
Diagnosis

Type of Service

Health Maintenance Visit
Diagnostic/Screening Test
Treatment

Mode of Documentation

Misdocumentation of Forms
Misdocumentation of Medical record
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Table 3 Goals of Deceptive Tactics

Goal

Examples

Expand coverage and/or decrease

Inflate diagnoses

patient financial burden

Find polyp to justify colonoscopy
Create symptom to justify diagnostic test
Keep child in hospital to observe parental behavior
Code for routine visit with other diagnosis
Undercode to save patient money

Decrease other burdens of care

Allow patient to take oncology drug at home
Make referral over the phone rather than in person

Protect patient privacy

Don't document pre-existing condition
Withhold requested records
Report lesser diagnosis

Increase physician reimbursement

Upcode
Perform unnecessary service
Note irrelevant examination elements
Fabricate number and length of visits
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Appendix 1
Physician Deception Study Interview Guide
Do you consent to participate in this study?

Y/N

Characteristics
I am going to begin by asking you some basic information about your practice.

Interviewer code:

Male / Female
Race_

How many years have you been in practice?

_yrs

Approximately how many patients do you see in an average week?

_pts

Do you perform any research? How many hours per week do you spend
on research?

_hrs

How many physicians work in your practice?

MDs

What percentage of your patients would you say are covered by managed
care?

_%
_hrs

Do you have any administrative duties? How many hours per week do
you spend on administrative duties?
Do you provide any pro bono medical care? Approximately how may

_hrs

hours per week?

Discussion Prompts
Now I am going to ask you to talk about physician deception of third-party payers.

Deception
•

In your field, what practices are you aware of that could be perceived as being
deceptive of third-party payers? How widespread do you think this kind of
deception is? Can you give me some real-life examples that you have observed'.’
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•

Why do physicians use deceptive practices? Why else? Any other reasons?
o

•

Do you think that patient characteristics matter? Any examples?

Some physicians will claim that they never employ deceptive practices. What to
you think stops them from doing so? Anything else?

•

Can you tell me about any times that something you did could have been
perceived as deceptive of third-party payers?
o

If YES: Can you give me one or more examples of what you did and what
the circumstances were?

o

If NO: For example, in the past year, have you a) up coded; b) used a
different diagnosis; c) described symptoms that were not actually present?
When? Why?

o

How do you decide if the use of deception is called for?

•

Why do you practice deception? Why wouldn't you practice deception?

•

Can you tell me about a time when you strongly considered employing a
deceptive practice, but in the end chose not to? Why? How did you think about
that?

Additional Probes
•

What is your greatest fear when you use deception? What are some other fears?

•

Do you feel pressure to deceive? Where does that pressure come from?

•

Does it bother you when you, or others, employ deceptive practices?

•

Are some deceptive practices more acceptable than others? If so, what sets them
apart?

•

Do you think that there are emotional or psychological factors that influence your
decision to use deception? If so, what are they?

Physician/Patient Relationship
•

When you use deception, how do you feel it affects your relationship with your
patient?
{If deception never used: How do you think physician deception of third-party
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payers affects the relationship between physician and patient?} Can you give me
some examples?
o

Do you tell your patients when you are practicing deception on their
behalf?

o

How do your patients respond when they are told or find out that you are
employing deceptive practices on their behalf

Quantitative Questions
We are almost done. I've just got five short questions to ask before we finish.

•

How many instances of deception would you estimate that you
have employed in the past year?

•

What do you believe is your percentage risk of being audited in the
next 12 months?

•

_%

If you are audited in the next twelve months, what do you believe
is the risk that the audit would identify deceptive practices that you
may have employed?

•

Do you know any physicians who have been audited? What % of
them were found in violation? Were any of them penalized? If so,
how?

•

_%

Do you ever discuss these types of deceptive practices with your
colleagues?

Is there anything else you would like to add before we finish the
interview?

_%
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